

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WEBSTER RASHADA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:23-cv-496

v.

Honorable Ray Kent

UNKNOWN WOODS et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. *See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act*, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.

“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” *Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.*, 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding

tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” *Id.* at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” *Id.* (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the *sine qua non* directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” *Id.* at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. *See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t*, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. *See Neals v. Norwood*, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).¹

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Inspector Unknown Woods, L.M.S.W. Unit Chief Unknown Maranka, Prison Counselor Unknown Sanborn, and Sergeant Unknown Leonhardt. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)

¹ *But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.*, 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in *Murphy Bros.* was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); *Williams v. King*, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing *Murphy Bros.*); *Burton v. Schamp*, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).

Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at ICF, he was housed in the Start Now unit. (*Id.*, PageID.4.) On April 4, 2022, Defendant Leonhardt and L.M.S.W. Minard (not a party) came to Plaintiff's cell and told him to "turn around and cuff up" for a "major unit shakedown." (*Id.*) Defendant Leonhardt made comments about documents Plaintiff had in his cell that were "connected with [Plaintiff's] civil suit against [Corrections Officer] Sheldon." (*Id.*) Plaintiff refused to cuff up in an "attempt to hide the important legal documents from custody." (*Id.*) Minard told Plaintiff that if he did not comply, staff would use gas and physical force on him. (*Id.*) Plaintiff thereafter complied with the order to cuff up. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff was placed in the shower cages and strip searched by Officer Odungua (not a party). (*Id.*) Defendants Woods approached and told Plaintiff that he would be placed in the segregation unit. (*Id.*) Defendant Maranka approached and told Plaintiff that he would "be placed in segregation for a while." (*Id.*, PageID.4–5.) Defendant Woods went to Plaintiff's cell and directed Defendant Leonhardt to throw Plaintiff's legal documents in the trash. (*Id.*, PageID.5.) Plaintiff was then escorted to segregation. (*Id.*) He alleges that during his time in segregation, he suffered increased symptoms of his PTSD, mood disorder, and depression. (*Id.*) He also suffered mental anguish and humiliation. (*Id.*)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts the following claims for relief: (1) First Amendment retaliation claims; (2) Eighth Amendment claims premised upon Plaintiff's placement in segregation and Defendants' deliberate indifference to his mental health needs; and (3) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims premised upon the disposal of Plaintiff's legal documents. (*See id.*, PageID.8.) Plaintiff also appears to assert a civil conspiracy claim, as he alleges that Defendants "agreed with each other to place Plaintiff in segregation." (*Id.*, PageID.5.) Finally, the Court construes Plaintiff to assert First Amendment access to the courts

claims premised upon the loss of his legal documents. Plaintiff requests declaratory relief, as well as compensatory damages. (*Id.*, PageID.6–7.)

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Id.*; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Id.* at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating

federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Official Capacity

As noted above, Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity: in this case, the MDOC. *See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); *Matthews v. Jones*, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. *See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); *O'Hara v. Wigginton*, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, *Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. *Abick v. Michigan*, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. *See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan*, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); *Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.*, 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); *McCoy v. Michigan*, 369 F. App'x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover, official capacity defendants are absolutely immune from monetary damages. *See Will*, 491 U.S. at 71; *Turker v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr.*, 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities on grounds of immunity.

Although damages claims against an official capacity defendant are properly dismissed on grounds of immunity, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief may constitute an exception to sovereign immunity. *See Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “*Ex parte Young* can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” *Ladd v. Marchbanks*, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.*, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Here, Plaintiff is no longer confined at ICF, which is where he avers that Defendants are employed and where the harm allegedly occurred.

The Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. *See Kensu v. Haigh*, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was transferred from the prison about which he complained); *Mowatt v. Brown*, No. 89-1955, 1990 WL 59896 (6th Cir. May 9, 1990); *Tate v. Brown*, No. 89-1944, 1990 WL 58403 (6th Cir. May 3, 1990); *Williams v. Ellington*, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991). Underlying this rule is the premise that such relief is appropriate only where plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the *result* of the challenged official conduct. *Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. *See, e.g., id.*; *Alvarez v. City of Chicago*, 649 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986); *Bruscino v. Carlson*, 654 F. Supp. 609, 614, 618 (S.D. Ill. 1987), *aff’d*, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988); *O’Shea v. Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96

(1974). Plaintiff has been transferred to MBP and has not alleged facts that would show that Plaintiff will be subjected to further future conduct by the individual Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly characterized as prospective. See *Ladd*, 971 F.3d at 581. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's official capacity claims in their entirety.

Because Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their official capacities only, his complaint is subject to dismissal for the reasons set forth above. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's complaint is also subject to dismissal for failure to set forth a meritorious claim for relief, as discussed below.

B. First Amendment Claims

1. Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him. The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert that Defendants retaliated against him because of his lawsuit against Corrections Officer Sheldon by placing him in segregation and disposing of his legal documents.

Retaliation based upon a prisoner's exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See *Thaddeus-X v. Blatter*, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. *Id.* Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's alleged retaliatory conduct. See *Smith v. Campbell*, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing *Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).

Plaintiff has alleged facts to meet the first two elements for his retaliation claims. See *Bell v. Johnson*, 308 F.3d 594, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that filing a civil rights lawsuit

constitutes protected conduct and that a cell search is sufficiently adverse where the search leaves the cell in disarray and results in the confiscation or destruction of materials); *see also Hill*, 630 F.3d at 474–75 (concluding that transfer to segregation can be sufficient to constitute adverse action). However, Plaintiff has provided the Court with no facts to plausibly suggest that Defendants’ confiscation and disposal of Plaintiff’s legal documents, as well as their placement of Plaintiff in segregation, was motivated in some way by Plaintiff’s protected conduct. It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be demonstrated by direct evidence. *See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter*, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005); *Murphy v. Lane*, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient.” *Murphy*, 833 F.2d at 108. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” *Harbin-Bey*, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting *Gutierrez v. Lynch*, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)); *see also Murray v. Unknown Evert*, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Lewis v. Jarvie*, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing *Crawford-El v. Britton*, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))).

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation in this matter. Although Plaintiff states that Defendant Leonhardt made “comments pertaining [to] documents in [Plaintiff’s] cell connected with [Plaintiff’s] civil suit against [Officer] Sheldon” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4), he alleges no *facts* from which the Court could infer that Defendant Woods instructed Defendant Leonhardt to dispose of Plaintiff’s documents because of the fact that Plaintiff had

previously filed a civil rights action against Officer Sheldon. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that Defendant Woods was aware of Plaintiff's lawsuit against Officer Sheldon. Therefore, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Leonhardt made comments about Plaintiff's legal documents, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Leonhardt threw away Plaintiff's documents on his own volition; instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Leonhardt acted at Defendant Woods's direction, and Plaintiff does not allege facts to suggest that Defendant Woods knew about the contents of the documents. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendants acted with a retaliatory motive when they searched Plaintiff's cell and confiscated some of his legal documents. Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show that Defendants acted with a retaliatory motive when they placed him in segregation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Woods and Maranka told him that he would be placed in segregation; however, as was the case with Plaintiff's cell search and the confiscation of his documents, Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Defendants Woods and Maranka were aware that Plaintiff had engaged in any protected conduct.

For these reasons, Plaintiff's speculative allegations fail to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against any named Defendant, and such claims will be dismissed.

2. Access to the Courts

The Court has construed Plaintiff's complaint to assert First Amendment access to the courts claims premised upon his allegation that Defendant Woods directed Defendant Leonhardt to throw Plaintiff's legal documents in the trash. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)

It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The principal issue in *Bounds* was whether the states must protect the right of access to the courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. *Id.* at 817. The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries

or alternative sources of legal knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates with “paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” *Id.* at 824–25. The right of access to the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate’s access to the courts. *See Knop v. Johnson*, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).

An indigent prisoner’s constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not, however, without limit. In order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show “actual injury.” *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); *see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl*, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); *Knop*, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the shortcomings in the prison legal assistance program or lack of legal materials have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 351–53; *see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield*, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury:

Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” *Thaddeus-X*, 175 F.3d at 391. Moreover, the underlying action must have asserted a non-frivolous claim. *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 353; *accord Hadix v. Johnson*, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing that *Lewis* changed actual injury to include requirement that action be non-frivolous).

In addition, the Supreme Court squarely has held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” *Christopher v. Harbury*, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” *Id.* at 415.

Plaintiff references his civil rights action against Corrections Officer Sheldon. The Court notes that in 2021, Plaintiff filed a civil rights action against Sheldon and other officers. *See Rashada v. Sheldon et al.*, No. 1:21-cv-919 (W.D. Mich.). Plaintiff, therefore, has sufficiently set forth an underlying cause of action for which there can be actual injury. Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is completely devoid of facts regarding how Defendants impeded his right to access the courts. Public records reflect that on October 25, 2022, Magistrate Judge Sally Berens dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Sheldon without prejudice because Plaintiff had failed to provide a valid service address for Sheldon. *See Order & J., Rashada v. Sheldon et al.*, No. 1:21-cv-919 (W.D. Mich.), (ECF Nos. 45, 46). The facts set forth in the instant complaint, however, concern events that occurred in April of 2022, several months before *Rashada v. Sheldon* was dismissed. Plaintiff fails to describe the legal documents that were allegedly disposed of, and he fails to set forth any facts regarding how the loss of those documents impeded his ability to litigate his lawsuit against Sheldon. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state claims for denial of access to the courts against Defendants, and such claims will be dismissed.

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating “deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff’s] serious mental health needs,” and by subjecting him to

“cruel [and] unusual punishment,” presumably based upon Plaintiff’s placement in segregation. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)

The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” *Ivey v. Wilson*, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 347; *see also Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” *Ivey*, 832 F.2d at 954.

Plaintiff’s complaint implicates two distinct Eighth Amendment claims: a claim based on placement in segregation, and a claim based on Plaintiff’s suggestions that Defendants have not provided adequate mental health treatment. The Court considers each claim below.

1. Placement in Segregation

In the MDOC, security classifications, from least to most secure, are as follows: Levels I, II, IV, V, and administrative segregation. MDOC Policy Directive 05.01.130 ¶ B (eff. Oct. 10, 2011). There are three types of segregation: temporary segregation, administrative segregation, and punitive segregation. MDOC Policy Directive 04.05.120 ¶¶ M, Q, Z (eff. June 1, 2019). Administrative segregation is the most restrictive and is imposed for institutional security, *e.g.*, when a prisoner poses a serious escape risk. *Id.* ¶ Q. Detention, or “punitive segregation,” can be

imposed as a sanction for committing a major misconduct, if ordered by the hearing officer. *Id.* ¶ Z. If possible, detention is served in a designated detention cell rather than in a cell designated for administrative segregation. *Id.* A prisoner may not remain in detention for a period longer than that ordered by the hearing officer, *id.*, but a prisoner classified to administrative segregation remains in that classification until he is reclassified, *id.* ¶ I. The “behavioral adjustment” of a prisoner in segregation is reviewed periodically by the SCC. *Id.* ¶ FFF. Reclassification from administrative segregation occurs only with the approval of the SCC and the Warden (or designee). *Id.* ¶ KKK.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits any punishment which violates the civilized standards of humanity and decency or involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. *See Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976). As discussed above, to state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must show that he has been deprived of the minimum civilized measures of life’s necessities. *See Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 347. Because placement in segregation is a routine discomfort that is a part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, it is typically insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. *See Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The Sixth Circuit has held that without a showing that basic human needs were not met, the denial of privileges as a result of administrative segregation cannot establish an Eighth Amendment violation. *See Evans v. Vinson*, 427 F. App’x 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2011); *Harden-Bey v. Rutter*, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008); *see also Lacey v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr.*, No. 95-1097, 1995 WL 564301 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1995) (concluding that placement in detention did not violate the Eighth Amendment); *Eaddy v. Foltz*, No. 85-1419, 1985 WL 14065 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1985) (discussing that whether an Eighth Amendment claim is stated for placement in segregation depends upon severity or pervasiveness of conditions).

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recently focused attention toward the consequences of long-term isolation in segregation:

The human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation long has been understood, and questioned, by writers and commentators. Eighteenth-century British prison reformer John Howard wrote “that criminals who had affected an air of boldness during their trial, and appeared quite unconcerned at the pronouncing sentence upon them, were struck with horror, and shed tears when brought to these darksome solitary abodes.” *The State of the Prisons in England and Wales* 152 (1777). In literature, Charles Dickens recounted the toil of Dr. Manette, whose 18 years of isolation in One Hundred and Five, North Tower, caused him, even years after his release, to lapse in and out of a mindless state with almost no awareness or appreciation for time or his surroundings. *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859). And even Manette, while imprisoned, had a work bench and tools to make shoes, a type of diversion no doubt denied many of today’s inmates.

One hundred and twenty-five years ago, this Court recognized that, even for prisoners sentenced to death, solitary confinement bears “a further terror and peculiar mark of infamy.” *In re Medley*, 134 U.S. 160, 170, 10 S. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835 (1890); see also *id.*, at 168, 10 S. Ct. 384 (“A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short [solitary] confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition . . . and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide”).

Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 287 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also *Glossip v. Gross*, 576 U.S. 863, 925–26 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the “dehumanizing conditions of confinement” and that “prolonged solitary confinement produces numerous deleterious harms”).

Indeed, several studies have shown that long-term isolation has deleterious psychological effects. “There is not a single study of solitary confinement wherein non-voluntary confinement that lasted for longer than 10 days failed to result in negative psychological effects.” *Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.*, 848 F.3d 549, 566 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, *Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement*, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 531 (1997)). “[E]ven a few days of solitary confinement will predictably shift the electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern toward an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.” *Id.* at 567 (quoting Stuart Grassian, *Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement*, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 325, 331 (2006)). Solitary confinement

frequently causes “[a]nxiety . . . [d]epression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, hallucinations, paranoia, claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation.” *Id.* at 566 (citing Haney & Lynch, *supra*, at 500–01, 521–31).

Further, the Sixth Circuit recently recognized that segregation more severely affects inmates with existing mental illness. *See J.H. v. Williamson Cnty.*, 951 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2020). “[S]olitary confinement ‘can cause severe and traumatic psychological damage’” and an inmate’s existing mental illness should be considered before placing him in or extending his isolation. *Id.* at 719 (quoting *Palakovic v. Wetzel*, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2017)); *see also Wallace v. Baldwin*, 895 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the continued isolation of an inmate raised a “genuine concern that the negative psychological effects of his segregation will drive him to self-harm” because he had a mental illness and had already been isolated for 11 years). While considering the mental health of the inmate, a court should remain “mindful of the nature and duration” of the confinement in segregation. *J.H.*, 951 F.3d at 719.

Here, Plaintiff suggests that his long-term placement in segregation exacerbated his PTSD, mood disorder, and depression, and caused him to experience mental anguish and humiliation. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff’s exhibits suggest that he was held in segregation for many months, and he states that “[a]s of now [he] is still being confined to administrative segregation.” (*Id.*)

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, do not sufficiently allege that any of the named Defendants were personally involved in the decision to keep Plaintiff in segregation for an extended period of time. A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. *Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); *Greene v. Barber*, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations from which the Court could infer that

any of the named Defendants were personally involved in classifying Plaintiff to long-term segregation. Moreover, given that Plaintiff is no longer at ICF, it cannot be said that any of the named Defendants are personally responsible for Plaintiff's present classification to segregation. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants regarding his placement in segregation.

2. Adequate Mental Health Treatment

The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 103–04. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide medically necessary mental health treatment as well. *See id.* at 103; *Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez*, 239 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2001); *Lay v. Norris*, No. 88-5757, 1989 WL 62498, at *4 (6th Cir. June 13, 1989); *Potter v. Davis*, No. 82-5783, 1985 WL 13129, at * 2 (6th Cir. April 26, 1985). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 104–05; *Comstock v. McCrary*, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).

A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. *Id.* In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. *Id.* The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” *Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.*, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); *see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty.*, 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008).

The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. *Brown v. Bargery*, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” *Id.* at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” *Rhinehart v. Scutt*, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842).

However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:

[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. *Darrah v. Krisher*, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); *Briggs v. Westcomb*, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); *Mitchell v. Hininger*, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and

considerable suffering. *Gabehart v. Chapleau*, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).

The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” *Westlake v. Lucas*, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” *Id.*; see also *Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw*, 749 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2014); *Perez v. Oakland Cnty.*, 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); *Kellerman v. Simpson*, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); *McFarland v. Austin*, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); *Edmonds v. Horton*, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); *Brock v. Crall*, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); *Berryman v. Rieger*, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” *Mitchell*, 553 F. App’x at 605 (quoting *Alspaugh v. McConnell*, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). He must demonstrate that the care he received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See *Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.*, 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Waldrop v. Evans*, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Although Plaintiff faults Defendants for demonstrating deliberate indifference to his mental health needs, the facts alleged by Plaintiff in no way rise to the level of deliberate indifference. As an initial matter, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that any of the named Defendants were personally responsible for providing mental health treatment to Plaintiff. Moreover, nothing in the complaint suggests that any of the named Defendants were aware of

Plaintiff's mental health needs. Plaintiff's speculative allegations simply fail to suggest that any of the named Defendants were aware of any "substantial risk of serious harm" to Plaintiff's mental health and failed to act to avoid such harm. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims premised upon Defendants' deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's mental health needs.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claims

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, presumably premised upon the confiscation and disposal of his legal documents. Plaintiff's claims, however, are barred by the doctrine of *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), *overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Under *Parratt*, a person deprived of property by a "random and unauthorized act" of a state employee has no federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. *Id.* at 541. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, although real, is not "without due process of law." *Id.* at 537. This rule applies to both negligent and intentional deprivations of property, as long as the deprivation was not done pursuant to an established state procedure. *See Hudson*, 468 U.S. at 530–36. Because Plaintiff's claim is premised upon allegedly unauthorized acts of a state official, he must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. *See Copeland v. Machulis*, 57 F.3d 476, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1995); *Gibbs v. Hopkins*, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993). Under settled Sixth Circuit authority, a prisoner's failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due process action. *See Brooks v. Dutton*, 751 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff has not sustained his burden in this case. Plaintiff has not alleged that state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims "against the state or any of its departments or officers." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6419(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit specifically has held that Michigan provides

adequate post-deprivation remedies for deprivation of property. *See Copeland*, 57 F.3d at 480. Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation, either negligent or intentional, of his property. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against Defendants.

E. Civil Conspiracy Claims

The Court has construed Plaintiff's complaint to assert civil conspiracy claims against Defendants because he contends that they "agreed with each other to place Plaintiff in segregation." (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)

A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is "an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action." *See Hensley v. Gassman*, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Hooks v. Hooks*, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. *Id.*; *Bazzi v. City of Dearborn*, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact that support a "plausible suggestion of conspiracy," not merely a "possible" one); *Fieger v. Cox*, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); *Spadafore v. Gardner*, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); *Gutierrez v. Lynch*, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff provides no allegations regarding any agreement among any of the named Defendants, other than the fact that they all are employed at ICF. Plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy are wholly conclusory. He alleges no *facts* that indicate the existence of a plan, much less that any Defendant shared a conspiratorial objective. As the Supreme Court has held, such

allegations, while hinting at a “possibility” of conspiracy, do not contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556. Instead, the Court has recognized that although parallel conduct may be consistent with an unlawful agreement, it is insufficient to state a claim where that conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed . . . behavior.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 567). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims under § 1983 will be dismissed.²

Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does

² Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims also would be barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine states that “if all of the defendants are members of the same collective entity, there are not two separate ‘people’ to form a conspiracy.” *Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed.*, 926 F.2d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 1991). Initially applied to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), *Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp.*, 40 F.3d 837, 839–40 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting *Hull*, 926 F.2d at 510), the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to claims under § 1983 as well, *Jackson v. City of Cleveland*, 925 F.3d 793, 817–19 (6th Cir. 2019). As a result, unless members of the same collective entity (such as the MDOC) are acting outside the scope of their employment, they are deemed to be one collective entity and not capable of conspiring. *Id.* at 819; *see also Novak v. City of Parma*, 932 F.3d 421, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2019) (same). Here, Defendants are members of the same collective entity—the MDOC. Plaintiff does not even allege, much less show, that Defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment. To bring claims outside of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants “acted other than in the normal course of their corporate duties.” *Johnson*, 40 F.3d at 840. Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts suggesting that Defendants were acting outside the normal course of their duties, however improperly he believes they may have been exercising those duties.

not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, *e.g.*, by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: June 8, 2023

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge